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In 1978 the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act, known as the Humphrey-
Hawkins Act (HH Act), established in the U.S. the current monetary policy procedures,
which the Federal Reserve (“the Fed”) has consistently executed in the past two decades.
The HH Act requires the Federal Reserve to target a stable and low inflation rate,
consistent with sustainable growth and a low unemployment rate. This explains why two
monthly U.S. economic reports receive major attention from the world’s financial markets:
the inflation and employment reports.
The analytical framework consistent with the HH Act, within which the decisions are
made by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), was constructed in the early
1980s under the Chairmanship of Mr. Paul Volcker, who had announced a major change
in monetary policy in October 6, 1979. I know, because I helped to construct the new
framework, starting from an internal memo written by Mr. Volcker himself in 1976.
The Fed’s analytical framework has not changed since, as was recently acknowledged, on
the Internet, by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. 1./ Dr. Alan Greenspan still uses
it, when he presents his biannual HH testimony before Congress in February and July each
year. Let me explain the Fed’s analytical framework in as concise terms as possible, to see
how we should interpret the Fed’s current monetary policy and its near term consequences
for the interest rates in the U.S. and the value of its dollar.
The Fed’s Analytical Framework
The analytical framework that we constructed in the early 1980s consists of three
fundamental economic relationships:
(1)  the expectations-augmented Phillips (EAP) curve;
(2)  the definition of the growth in unit labor costs; and
(3)  Okun’s Law(i)  The expectations-augmented Phillips (EAP) curve is taken to be one of the most
reliable in macroeconomics. Rising unemployment tends to lower wage growth and
vice versa. But there is a twist, because of the adaptively adjusting inflation
expectations. People’s expectations catch on and after a while the effect of a higher,
respectively lower unemployment rate, i.e., of more or less slack in the labor market
wears off. So, on the surface one can observe higher inflation rates to coincide with
higher unemployment rates and there is no obvious trade-off between the two.
However, adjusted for inflation expectations, the trade-off between unemployment and
inflation clearly holds true in the States.
(ii)  Growth in unit labor costs equals the difference between wage growth and growth in
labor productivity. In other words, the growth in labor costs can be lowered not only
by reducing wage growth, but also by increasing productivity growth. The growth in
labor productivity is caused by efficiency enhancing technological innovations, which
are considered exogenous to the policy domain of the Federal Reserve.
 
(iii)   Okun’s law provides the final link in the chain between inflation and output growth.
Okun’s Law is the negative correlation found between unemployment and output
growth. An increase in the growth of output tends to lower the rate of unemployment
and vice versa.
In the words of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland: “The Phillips curve, together with
Okun’s law, essentially codify much of the conventional wisdom about monetary policy in
a formal statistical way.” 1./
Implications Of The Fed’s Framework
The first implication of this macro-economic framework is that the EAP curve, together
with the definition of unit labor cost growth provide a way to compute a Non-
Accelerating-Inflation-Rate-of-Unemployment (NAIRU), the unemployment rate below
which inflationary pressures build up and above which inflationary pressures subside. 2./
What is often not recognized, however, is that this NAIRU is not static, but changes under
the impact of ,i.a., the growth in labor productivity. When the growth in labor productivity
decreases, the NAIRU rises, and when productivity growth increases, the NAIRU
declines. Thus the NAIRU rose during the 1970s, in the aftermath of the two oil price
shocks of 1974 and 1979, when the U.S. economy adjusted with difficulty to higher
energy costs. But the NAIRU appears now to (very slowly) decline, after the massive
efficiency restructuring of the U.S. economy, which was triggered by several deregulations
in the transportation and financial services industries under the Reagan Administration..
The second implication of the Fed’s analytical framework is that there is a potential GDP
growth rate, i.e., a rate of long-run sustainable output growth. But again, because of
exogenous factors, like technological innovation and consequent productivity growth (notonly of labor, but also of capital), this sustainable rate of output growth is not a constant
but gradually changes over time.
The third implication is that expectations play an important role: the faster the
expectations of inflation adjust, the less effective is monetary policy. In the extreme
theoretical case of instantaneous adjustment implied by rational expectations, monetary
policy is impotent. Surprisingly, despite the avalanche of raw economic and financial data,
empirical expectations adjust only slowly. One important reason is, perhaps, that the raw
economic and financial data are not consistently analyzed, different interpretations result
and consensus expectations form only very slowly.
During the past two years, in 1994 and 1995, Dr. Greenspan, in his HH testimonies, has
explicitly acknowledged that despite its formidable reservoir of capable and proficient
research staff, the Fed’s own knowledge and understanding of what is happening in the
economy is very weak and uncertain. In reference to the framework the Cleveland
economists even stated in July: “Unfortunately, the measure of our ignorance about these
important variables is large indeed, and the magnitudes really matter.”
The Fed’s Track Record
Question: how well has the Fed fared with this simple analytical framework for its
monetary policy decisions? Answer: remarkably well!
In the summer of 1982, when I was an Economist of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, I was asked to compute the required unemployment trajectory to bring down
inflation and to keep it at three percent, using this analytical framework. The reason was,
that the Fed wanted to opportunistically use the impending recession at the end of 1982 to
reduce inflation to a sustainable level. Consumer price inflation had raged at a peak of
14% immediately after the second oil shock of 1979. The question was: to what level must
the unemployment rate be pushed up to bring inflation down to the three percent required
by the HH Act and to keep it there?
This was a simple dynamic control problem, where the unemployment rate was viewed as
the controllable variable and the rate of inflation the target variable. 3./ The analytical
framework could be simplified to a controllable differential equation, which I used to trace
out on graph paper (PC were not yet en vogue at the New York Fed in 1982) the mutually
consistent trajectories of the rates of total unemployment and official CPI inflation (Graph
1).
In 1983, when the success of Volcker’s monetary policy had already become clear, my
colleague Steven Englander and I were allowed to publish the details of our analytical
framework in the Quarterly Review, the flagship publication of the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York 4./  It was the ultimate official imprimatur of the Fed’s new decision
framework.Later, in 1990 , when I worked as a Senior Economist for Nomura Research Institute in
New York, I plotted the historical trajectories of these same rates of unemployment and
inflation, and demonstrated to my Japanese superiors that the Fed had remarkably closely
followed the originally projected paths. A wider historical perspective confirms this track
record (Graph 2)
There is an important implication of the Fed’s framework, though, which is not well
understood by the markets. When I had traced the projected paths in the summer of 1982,
I had calculated the NAIRU to be 6.5%. But Dr. Greenspan had apparently fully absorbed
and understood our framework, when he became Chairman in 1987. Dr. Greenspan
realized that the deregulations and efficiency restructuring of the U.S. economy could
have lowered the NAIRU and during his first term he immediately started to pushed actual
unemployment below our computed “barrier” of 6.5%, down to 5.5%.
Dr. Greenspan’s interpretation was correct, but his timing was off, since the NAIRU had
not yet sufficiently declined. Consequently, the actual rate of unemployment came out
below the NAIRU and inflation started to rise from its 3% trend to a 4% trend and
sometimes even occasionally even higher (Graph 3).
It did not take too long for the Fed’s economists to realize that Dr. Greenspan had made a
policy mistake. But Dr. Greenspan preferred to wait until the 1991/92 recession to bring
inflation opportunistically down again to the 3% trend level by raising the unemployment
rate to 8% again. He was also forced to wait, since in 1987 he had been immediately
confronted with the unenviable task of functioning as “lender-of-last-resort” to prevent the
consequences of “Black Monday’s” stock market crash of 1987 from spreading through
the economy. Although the Fed had, within two weeks after the provision of extra
liquidity for the stock brokers, pumped this excess liquidity out of the markets again, it
wanted to avoid the impression that it was tightening too much.
Furthermore, Dr. Greenspan has made it perfectly clear in his HH testimony in July that he
thinks that holding the line on inflation “does not impose a speed limit on economic
growth.” He said to have observed that “the inability to pass cost increases through to
higher prices provides a powerful incentive to firms to increase profit margins through
innovation and greater efficiency, which boosts productivity and ultimately standards of
living over time.” 5./ It is only through increased economic efficiency and a rise in
productivity growth that the NAIRU can be lowered and the sustainable growth rate of
the U.S. be raised.
Currently, now that Dr. Greenspan’s third term has been confirmed, the Fed clearly makes
another attempt to test if the NAIRU has declined. This is part and parcel of the Fed’s
opportunistic inflation policy. When there a period of slow growth looms, the Fed will use
its monetary control to marginally enlarge the resulting unemployment rate, by maintaining
monetary tightness and by restricting bank lending just a bit longer than expected, to bring
inflation down to the 1.5% which Dr. Greenspan would like to see in the long run.However, Dr. Greenspan’s Fed will not induce a recession to achieve that target. It prefers
to surf the natural wave of the business cycle to do so and waits for a suitable opportunity.
The Current State of the U.S. Economy
After a small bout of consumer price acceleration this past spring, mainly due to food and
energy items, overall consumer price inflation in the U.S. has returned to 3% in July and
remains now, in the words of Chairman Greenspan, “quiescent.” Inflation has thus
returned to the 3% trend path it has followed the last five years. Better still, the closely
watched core inflation rate stood in July at 2.7%, the lowest year-to-year percentage
increase in 30 years and it’s been about 3% for the past three years. In addition, the July
wholesale prices showed a zero increase. Although the rate of producer price inflation is
very volatile and only loosely correlated to (lagged) retail price inflation, it is now on
average more than two percentage points below last year’s rate.
These moderate inflation figures combined with a July unemployment rate of 5.4%, close
to its 30 year low too, suggest that the Fed’s second test - if the NAIRU has declined -
may have turned out to be successful. Indirectly these indicators imply a new NAIRU of
close to 5.5%. 6./ This full percentage point drop in comparison with the NAIRU of the
early 1980s can then be attributed to the remarkable technological innovations that have
occurred in the U.S. in the past decade.
By implication, the sustainable growth rate of the U.S. has somewhat increased, probably
from close to 2.0% to about 2.5%. According to the Commerce Department’s final figures
expanded at a 2.2% in the first quarter and not at the too high 2.8% rate, which was
revised down because of a massive drawdown of inventories. Much of this reflected a
strike-induced reduction in automobile stocks.
Today’s U.S. economy has thus been called a “Goldilocks”economy with moderate
growth, accompanied by low unemployment and relatively low inflation. The next
question is: which way will the U.S. economy be going? Its answer will determine if there
is potential upward pressure on inflation to be expected or not.
In contrast to Volcker’s Fed, Greenspan’s Fed is not openly pro-active although Dr.
Greenspan still claims that “Federal Reserve policy has, for some time now, been designed
to act preemptively.” Because of the uncertainties involved in estimating magnitudes, it
has adopted a more conservative policy mode. As Dr. Greenspan testified: ”...we respond
to evidence that those strains themselves are developing.”
The current economy appears to slow down a bit after the rebuilding of inventories in the
second quarter, although a recession in the second half of 1996, originally expected
already since the end of 1995, isn’t clearly materializing (Graph 4). According to the
Employment Report of August 2
nd, subdued job growth and declining working hours and
reduced growth in hourly wages in July (at 2.9%, down from 3.4% in June) offered theclearest signs yet that the U.S. economy is throttling down from the second quarter’s fast
pace. This takes the pressure of the Fed to raise interest rates at its policy meeting on
August 20
th. But since the Fed’s monetary policies impact the economy with a lag of half a
according to the latest phase correlations, the Fed’s forecast horizon is between half a year
and a year and it has to look ahead (Graph 6).
The Fed’s Current Action Plan
The particular question the Fed faces is thus: where is the U.S. economy heading in the
spring and summer of 1997? The Blue Chip survey foresees the economy expanding at
2.6% real GDP growth in the whole of 1996, with a slower 2% through the remainder of
1996 and into1997. The Survey sees next year’s rate of inflation similar to this year’s
2.8% - 3.2%.
The Governors of the Federal Reserve Board and the Presidents of Federal Reserve Banks
officially expect 2.5% - 2.75% throughout 1996 (Table 2.). Given the strong performance
of real GDP in the first half of the year, this forecast implies still somewhat slower growth
in the second half of this year, similar to the Blue Chip survey forecast, and a slowdown to
1.75% to 1.25% in 1997.
The answer of what will happen in 1997, may, perhaps, be provided by the Fed’s latest
business cycle prediction tool. Within the Fed there is currently strong support to use the
Treasury yield curve as main predictor of the U.S. business cycle, by looking at the ratio
between the short-term bill rates and the 10-year bond rates. When this ratio is below
unity, i.e., the yield curve is upward sloping, the unbiased expectation is that in the near
future short term interest rates will rise due to excess demand for cash resulting from a
business expansion. Vice versa, when this ratio is above unity and the yield curve is
inverted, the expectation is that the short term interest rates will drop due to a lack of
demand for cash resulting from a business contraction. The rationale for using this
prediction tool is that it reflects the collective wisdom of all market participants, whose
decisions and expectations help determine bond yields (Graph 7.)
Currently the spread between the three-month rate and the 10-year rate is still about 140
basis points (i.e., above its mean spread of 120 basis points) and their ratio is 0.79: the
U.S. yield curve is clearly upward sloping (Graph 4.). That ratio puts the likelihood of a
recession four quarters from now at less than 5%, according to two Senior Economists of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Combining the tightness in the labor market with this prediction of no major slowdown
within the period of a year and with Dr. Greenspan’s cautionary HH testimonies in July,
suggests that he will keep his finger on the trigger, ready to tighten credit if and when
there is any sign of rising price inflation emerges. But, for the moment, I’m sure, he savors
the not yet completely corroborated possibility of a lowered NAIRU, which implies that it
may not be necessary to raise interest rates for another half year to keep inflation at 3%.Fact is that Greenspan’s Fed has almost given up to lower the inflation rate to its proffered
long term goal of 1.5%, i.e., the current rate of inflation in Germany. Lately Fed
economists have publicly talked about the opportunistic element in the Fed’s monetary
policy. As said, the Fed will lower the inflation rate only riding on the back of an already
occurring recession or period of slow growth, which can then be marginally deepened and
lengthened. Such a policy looks similar to the policy Chairman Volcker implemented in
1982, but is much less drastic and more marginal.
In this context it is significant that Dr. Greenspan did allow in his HH testimony for a
somewhat higher unemployment rate than 5.4% when so required, since he stated, “for the
remainder of this year and the next in these projections, the unemployment rate remains in
the range of the past 1-1/2 years.” That period includes at the very beginning an
unemployment rate of  close to 6.0%, i.e., clearly above the new NAIRU!
A slightly increased unemployment rate once in a while is less feared by politicians in the
U.S. than in Europe. In the U.S. labor markets have always been remarkably flexible and
efficient, since about ¾ of the 5.4% unemployment rate consist of friction unemployment,
i.e., unemployment caused by workers and employees geographically and functionally
moving from old to new jobs. Furthermore, the employment-to-population ratio of 63.2%
shows a healthy employed-dependent ratio in the U.S.
In the past 3-1/2 years alone more than 10 million net new jobs have added to the U.S.
economy. Diffusion indices reveal that this net increase has been distributed among a wide
variety of industries. This is in sharp contrast to Europe, where since 1979 no net new
jobs have been created. Europe’s 10-12% unemployment rates consist primarily of
structural unemployment, thanks to its highly inefficient labor markets. Therefore
European politicians view any further increase in their unemployment rates with much
trepidation.
Interaction With Federal Fiscal Policy
In the early part of the 1980s fiscal policy in the U.S. was dominated by increased
spending on both “guns and butter.” It was President Reagan’s confirmed policy to
outspend the “evil empire” of Soviet Communism, while maintaining and even increasing
the standard of living for all Americans. Reagan’s simple economic understanding was that
the efficient U.S. production system could adjust to this vast economic expansion, but that
the inefficient command economy of the Soviet Union would collapse under the imposed
strains. His assessment was correct. The Soviet Economy started to break down already in
the second half of the 1980s and produced a thunderous implosion in 1989.
There was one flaw in Reagan’s policy of increased defense spending combined with a tax
cut: it led to the perennial “double deficit problem”, i.e., huge Federal deficits combined
with current account deficits. These deficits have thus far been financed by substantial netcapital inflows from abroad. Obviously, the allied partners of Europe and Japan helped to
finance Reagan’s policy to secure a future world free of Soviet Communism.
The increased production potential of the U.S. together with the retirement savings of the
aging baby boomers should be able to pay off these foreign debts in the 21
st century. It is
important to recognize, however, that most of the accumulated federal debt is owed to
(and owned by) American citizens and not to foreigners, thus the foreign debt burden is
not choking the U.S. economy in any way. It is similar to the debts the U.S. incurred in the
19
th century, when it was an emerging nation (and for five years embroiled in a civil war),
or to the debts it incurred during the Second World War (which have all been paid off).
Thus the U.S. considers servicing these Cold War debts the price to be paid for freedom.
In his HH Congressional testimonies Dr. Greenspan continues to make the obligatory
remarks about the need to reduce the federal deficits, although they are relatively small
now. The Federal deficit is estimated to be US$117 billion for fiscal year 1996, or a
projected 1.6% in fiscal ’96, sharply down from a peak US$290 billion or 4.9% of GDP in
fiscal ’92. 7./ Dr. Greenspan remains worried about “the dying out of serious discussions
that might lead to a bipartisan agreement to eliminate the budget deficit over time.”
Greenspan’s Fed has always been a strong proponent of a balanced budget and it would
like to see these deficits further decreased, because they tend to complicate monetary
policy, for two reasons.
First, the federal deficits tend to keep U.S. interest rates higher than in the other
industrialized countries, to attract the required capital to finance the continuing federal
deficits. These net capital flows make the U.S. dependent, since the resulting foreign debt
has to be serviced.
Second, high government deficits tend to induce high domestic interest rates, which tend
to slow project financing by bank lending. This phenomenon is called “crowding out.”
Fortunately, the relative shortage of debt capital has been compensated in the 1980s and,
in particular, in the 1990s by the (until recently) booming U.S. stock market, which has
found new cheaper (equity) funding from 160 million Americans, who now invest in the
stock market via mutual funds. Mutual funds have begun to seriously replace bank
accounts in the U.S.
Unfortunately, Congressional Budget Office projections show that under current fiscal
policies the Federal deficits will widen again after 1997 (Graph 8.) Total federal revenue
as a share of GDP will marginally decline from 18.9% in 1995 to 18.5% in 2001 and will
remain at that level through 2006. These trends reflect a continuation of those observed in
the past. What remains worrisome is that the upward trend in projected federal spending
continues to be dominated by increased mandatory outlays for Medicare and Social
Security, despite the fact that already in 1983 Dr. Greenspan succeeded in getting Social
Security partially funded.The Clinton Administration has not succeeded to dent these mandatory spending trends,
which were already meticulously researched by the Office of Management and Budget
under the Bush Administration, despite the rather successful Deficit Reduction Act of
1993. A new deficit reduction effort is required, but the proposed entitlement reform for
fiscal year 1996 has just been vetoed. Excluding offsetting receipts, mandatory spending is
thus expected to grow from 10.3% of GDP in 1995 to 12.9% in 2006, mainly as the result
of increased health care costs. As a result, the baseline federal deficit is on course to jump
from 2.3% of GDP in 1995 and a projected 1.6% in 1996 back to 3.3% in 2006, barring
any change in fiscal policies.
The current Republican Presidential candidates Robert Dole and his Vice Presidential
candidate Jack Kemp advocate a 15% federal tax cut, based on supply side arguments, and
Mr. Dole is in favor of increased defense spending. History shows that such an
Reaganesque combination will lead to larger and not to smaller deficits as percentage of
GDP, unless this new Administration can miraculously overcome the strong forces of
resistance to cut the mandatory outlays.
In this context it must be heartening to the Fed that Mr. Dole endorses a bill which would
force the Fed to make price stability its only goal, by amending the Humphrey-Hawkins
Act, which requires the Fed to target simultaneously price stability and low
unemployment. Apparently, Mr. Dole wants to put the political burden of inducing or
deepening a recession to keep inflation stable squarely on the shoulders of the Fed. But, at
least, he attempts to make the Fed less vulnerable to Congressional fire during the
biannual HH testimonies.
To maintain the resulting higher interest rates stable, the Fed, by implication, has to
carefully provide monetary liquidity, without inflaming the inflation expectations. In the
past two and a half decades, since the Smithsonian Agreement of 1971 and the
introduction of the floating exchange rate system in 1973, the U.S. implicitly printed
money and gradually devalued the dollar. Via the double deficits this excess currency
ended mostly ends up overseas in the form of Eurodollars or in the form of physical
dollars used as preferred medium of exchange in some dollarized emerging markets,
including, ironically, the former Soviet Union. In  fact, of the about US$400 billion of the
currency in circulation, an astonishing more than 50% is held outside the U.S.. Chairman
Greenspan acknowledged in his July HH testimony that the foreign seigniorage of the
generation of these excess dollars is about US$10 billion annually in favor of the U.S.
Treasury.
But an important change may be in the making. The foreign demand for U.S. currency,
which has expanded at an average annual rate of nearly 8.5% over the past 22 years, has
drastically dropped this year. U.S. currency is growing this year at only 3% and has
slowed the growth in the monetary base to an annual rate of only 1.8% since January,
while the monetary aggregate M1 has fallen at a 1.5% annual rate through June. Recently
the U.S. Treasury has started to replace the old “greenbacks” with more sophisticatedanti-fraud dollars, but this may have scared the shadow economies in the emerging
markets to keep the U.S. dollar as its preferred medium of exchange.
The Fed Ignores The Dollar Value
It has been customary policy for the Federal Reserve to ignore the fundamental value of
the dollar. The Fed’s foreign currency desk in New York occasionally intervenes in the FX
markets to maintain continuous trading and to prevent “gapping,” and it occasionally
assists the interventions by the Bundesbank and the Bank of Japan, for the same reason.
But that is the extent of its FX involvement. The fundamental value of the dollar is of
policy concern to Mr. Robert Ruben, the U.S. Treasurer, since he has to sell U.S.
Treasury securities. But the dollar’s value is clearly more of concern to foreign
governments than to the U.S. government.
Recall that since the Smithsonian agreement of 1971, the U.S. dollar’s fundamental value
has been in a secular decline, with a massive hick-up in 1986, around the time of the Plaza
Accord. In fact, thanks to the continuation of the double deficit, the dollar is destined to
lose even more of its fundamental value.
Mind you, the U.S. dollar is still the dominant anchor currency: it is used in about 60% of
the world transactions. The Deutschmark in 20% and the Yen in 16%. Many emerging
markets, even the non-dollarized ones, have linked their currencies to the U.S. dollar,
thereby further increasing the U.S. dollar’s influence.
Still, this all does not concern the non-mercantilist American consumers, who hardly take
the dollar’s value versus that of other currencies into account, except, perhaps, when they
travel overseas on a tourist vacation. (Corporate producers are apparently the only ones
concerned, be it in the U.S. or in Japan). It is also easy to see why there is such a domestic
lack of concern for the dollar’s value. The 260 million U.S. citizens spend only about 10%
of their income on foreign goods and services. To hedge the risks associated with
imported inflation because of the decline in the dollar’s value (on a trade-weighted basis,
which is much less dramatic than the partial declines versus the Deutschmark or the
Japanese Yen!), which could hurt their standard of living, American consumers would
have to invest only 10% of their assets in foreign securities. To do otherwise would create
a purchasing power mismatch.
But the data show an even smaller percentage: Americans invest only about 4% of their
assets abroad and are apparently mismatched by 6%. However, this is evidence of rational
collective behavior, because 60% of the imported goods and services in the U.S. are
dollar-denominated (e.g., imported oil) or denominated in currencies linked to the dollar.
There are thus no inflation risks associated with these goods and services. Since 60% of
10% = 6%, Americans have to hedge only against the imported inflation on he remaining
40% of goods and services and invest thus only 40% of 10% = 4% of their assets in
foreign denominations.In addition, it can be demonstrated that bon a risk-adjusted basis the rates of total return
on investments in emerging markets, even the one in Asia, is about the same to those
within the U.S.. Thus, when the currency volatility of the Asian currencies increases
because of political turmoil or weakening banking systems, there is even less reason for
Americans to invest in Asia. All this explains why Americans don’t invest many of their
assets overseas, why they exhibit a relative lack of concern about their dollar’s
fundamental value and why they are fickle when it comes to committing their assets to
Asia..
This is of course not true for the 180 million Japanese, since Japan is an island economy
and quickly suffers from imported inflation (So does Germany). Japan benefits from the
low dollar denominated oil price to keep its energy costs down (and so does Germany),
which explains why it was willing to foot part of the bill for the Gulf War in 1990.
However, the export manufacturers in both Japan and Germany experience competition
from the low priced American products. But, instead of fighting the secular decline of the
dollar, however, some producers, like the car manufacturers, overcome this problem by
building greenfield operations in the now logistically very efficient and productive U.S.,
e.g., Honda, Toyota, Mazda, Volkswagen, Mercedes Benz, BMW, etc.
Clearly, the U.S. clearly does not have to fear from lower wages, even when the dollar
would not decline in value, otherwise these car factories would have been built just over
the border in Mexico. Global competition is executed on the basis of unit labor costs and
high productivity, not on the basis of starving wages.
Why Doesn’t The U.S. Dollar Collapse?
Overall, the dollar is in a secular decline, but it doesn’t collapse, because
(1)  it is the dominant global medium of exchange;
(2)  too many countries hold huge U.S. currency reserves;
(3)  too many countries view the U.S. as their major export market and can’t afford to let
their currencies appreciate versus the dollar;
(4)  too many countries have now major earnings generating direct investments in the U.S..
The region enjoying the Pax Americana is dollarized, just like the region enjoying Pax
Romana 2,000 years ago was “centurianized” by Rome’s currency. Currently mercantilist
foreign governments, in particular Asian governments, and more specifically Japan, quietly
support the value of the U.S. dollar, because they still prefer the Pax Americana above a
(now outdated) Pax Sovietica or a (still possible) Pax Sinica..
For example, we know that any tendency for the required foreign capital inflow not to
finance the U.S. current account deficit will initiate a decline in the dollar’s value. But in
the first quarter of this year the preliminary U.S. current account deficit of $142 billion (atan annual rate) was accompanied by a contrary net private capital outflow (Graph 5.).
Consequently, the dollar should have declined in value. However, it didn’t, since the
requisite net capital inflow came when foreign governments rescued the dollar by adding
US$206.5 billion (at annual rate) to their official holdings.
Foreign governments purchased the dollar to avoid their own currencies to appreciate
versus the U.S. dollar, which could hurt their exports to the deepest and most liquid
export market in the world (Graph 6.). 8./ The rise in the dollar to a 2-1/2 year high
against the Yen, has tended to divert the domestic U.S. demand toward imported goods
and distressed corporate America.
Since most economists expect this year’s current account deficit of the U.S. to deteriorate
and to exceed last year’s US$148 billion somewhat, the dollar should fundamentally
remain weak and more support by foreign governments may be required. The multi-billion
dollar question is: how long can foreign governments support the U.S. dollar’s value? The
recent rather sudden reversal in the dollars 15 month rally from its record lows suggests
“not too long.”
Because of the actions of foreign governments, the dollar had gained ground against the
Yen in spite of periodic expectations of Japanese monetary tightening. Recent statements
suggest that Japan’s central bank is still attempting to sustain Japan’s economic recovery
with low and stable rates, because of the considerable weakness and risk in its faltering
banking system.
On the other side of the U.S., there is concern that the European Monetary Union will be
delayed, since now none of the members is expected to meet the unrealistic economic
convergence criteria by the deadline of January 1997 or even the official starting date for a
European single currency in 1999. The Bundesbank appears not ready, under these
circumstances, to hand over its monetary reins to the new European Monetary Institute,
i.e., the newly created “central bank” of Europe. Following President Reagan’s example of
the early 1980s, it prefers to continue its fight with the German unions about Germany’s
too lavish welfare policy.
Consequently, the Deutschmark strengthened recently versus most other European
currencies, in particular against the French franc and the Italian lira. Although the U.S.
dollar had generally risen against the Deutschmark this year on signs of a strengthening
U.S. economy, it recently dropped in the wake of reports showing renewed German
growth.
Currently, of the three leading currency economies, Germany has the steepest yield curve,
with an interest-rate spread of 330 basis points between the 10-year and the 3-month
rates, followed by Japan (260 basis points spread) and then the U.S. (150 basis points).
Thus at this moment the financial markets expect the short term rates in Germany to
increase first and most, followed by Japan and only then the U.S. In addition, the U.S.
inflation rate is at 3.% the highest, followed by Germany at 1.5% and Japan’s close tozero. Thus on a purchasing power basis there is another argument for a fundamentally
weaker dollar.
Does Politics Influence the Fed?
The fact that this is an election year does not influence the Fed’s independent and
collective decisions. First, Dr. Greenspan is a Republican and he may therefore personally
favor Mr. Dole as Presidential candidate. But recall Dr. Greenspan raised, when so
required, the Fed Funds rate in August 1988, when the Republican Bush Administration
ran for reelection, just to prove that the Fed was politically independent.. For the same
reason he may now prefer not to raise the Fed Funds rate.
Secondly, the Federal Open Market Committee is a collective body, whose members
reflect a wide diversity of political and non-political views. The Fed is very proud of its
political independence, which year after year is challenged by newly proposed
Congressional bills and time after time has been reasserted. Its staff of dedicated, capable
and proficient Ph.D. economists performs high quality analysis and independent research.
Politics does not influence the Fed. When the FOMC takes the decision to raise interest
rates, it will be on the basis of analysis of only the economic and financial facts, viewed
through the glasses of the analytical framework I have described above. Therefore
speculation about the political motives of the Fed is a wasted effort.
Conclusion
Both the U.S. and German central banks hold their major meetings in the week of August
19. The FOMC meets on August 20
th and 21
st , and the Bundesbank on August 22
nd. My
current prediction (made on August 15
th) is that the Fed will not raise the Fed Funds rate
at its August meeting. It can afford to wait, since the latest inflation figures show the
inflation rate to be stable at about 3% and even somewhat declining at the producer level.
But when the Dole-Kemp team wins the November Presidential elections and a serious
possibility of a 15% tax cut combined with increased defense spending materializes, the
Fed is sure to raise interest rates either late this year or early in 1997 to preemptively
offset such an expansionary fiscal policy.
Considering the continuing saga of the U.S. double deficit problem, the fundamental value
of the dollar must remain in decline for as long as no surpluses are run. In addition, the
higher rate of inflation in the U.S. in comparison with the rates in Germany and Japan,
continues to erode its value. Assuming that the three anchor currency markets are fully
integrated and efficient, the yield curves in the respective markets unbiasedly signal higher
short term interest rates to come first in Europe, then Japan and only then in the U.S. But
then again, we have seen that foreign governments do not always heed what the privatefinancial markets expect them to do. So let the customer be aware, in particular in the $1.3
trillion a day currency markets!
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Footnotes
1.  The Internet URL for the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (FRBC) is
http:www.clev.frb.org. The FRBC publication quoted here is: July Economic Trends:
The Economy in Perspective, July 1996, from where Graphs 3., 5. And 6. Are
borrowed. The yield curve in Graph 6. is from The Asian Wall Street Journal, August
15, 1996 and refers to the yield curve of Tuesday August 13, 1996 in the U.S. For an
excellent reference on the operational implementation of the Fed’s monetary policy,
see the official book by Ann-Marie Meulendyke, U.S. Monetary Policy and Financial
Markets, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1989. For an insightful history of policy
making under Mr. Paul Volcker, see the book by William C. Melton, Inside the Fed:
Making Monetary Policy, Dow Jones-Irwin, Homewood, Illinois, 1985.
2.  See the attached Technical Appendix: Computation of the Natural Rate of
Unemployment for the details. This appendix was published in 1983 as part of the
article cited in footnote 4.
3.  In the 1970s several Ph.D. dissertations had been devoted to the topic of dynamic
control of inflation via controlling the growth rate of the economy, e.g., a Yale
University dissertation (1974) by Guiellermo Calvo, who was one of my Professors of
Economics at Columbia University (1973-86) and who became later a Senior Advisor
of the International Monetary Fund (1988-93).
4.  A. Steven Englander and Cornelis A. Los, “Recovery Without Accelerating Inflation?,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Review, Vol. 8, No. 2,  Summer 1983,
pp. 19 - 28. If I were to do the analysis again, I would completely discard the
prejudiced econometrics of single equation regression equation analysis we employed
then to compute the reaction coefficients of the EAP curve and Okun’s Law, based on
the critique in my article “The Prejudices of Least Squares, Principal Components andCommon Factor Schemes,” Computers and Mathematics with Applications, Vol. 17,
No. 8-9 (1989), pp. 1269 - 1283. When I was a Senior Economist at the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, I advised in 1986 and 1987 that the econometric
procedures used by the Board were prejudiced and faulty. In 1993 I sent letters to
both the Senate and House Banking Committees and to Dr. Greenspan to warn about
the serious consequences of continued use of such prejudiced research methodology
by the Fed. Only Dr. Greenspan responded with a thank you note and he incorporated
the warning about the uncertainty inherent in the Fed’s analytic capabilities in his HH
testimonies (Cf. Section 3.0, last paragraph). Now I would use Kalman’s advanced
algebraic geometric system analysis to identify and compute the required parameters
consistent with the empirical data, as suggested in my articles “Scientific View of
economic Data Analysis,” Eastern Economic Journal, Vol. 17, No. 1 (January-March
1991), pp. 61 - 71, and in “A Scientific View of Economic and Financial Data
Analysis” in Advances in Stochastic Modelling and Data Analysis (Eds. J. Janssen and
C. H. Skiadas), Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995, pp. 111 - 127. This new
methodology results in a much better understanding of the amount of analytical
uncertainty inherent in the empirical data. But the new methodology would probably
not have changed the computation of my dynamic control trajectories.
5.  Alan Greenspan, “Monetary Policy Testimony and Report to the Congress,” July 18,
1996, 13 pages. This testimony can be found on the homepage of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve, with http://www.bog.frb.fed.us. Dr. Greenspan’s
testimony is usually at 10:00am, but was delayed by one hour until 11:00am, because
of a Senate vote. This roiled the global financial markets a bit. His testimony was, as
always, accompanied by a more elaborate official document from the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Monetary Policy Report to the Congress
Pursuant to the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, July 18, 1996,
24 pages, from where I took Table 1. This is the document distributed to the press
beforehand. I had also the benefit of receiving from Dr. Paul Bennett, the current
Director of Research of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and a former
colleague, the transcripts of both HH hearings before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on July 18, 1996 and before the House of
Representatives Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy of the
Committee on Banking and Financial Services. I thank Dr. Bennett very much for his
expeditious response to my urgent request.
6.  Within the Fed economists currently discuss even the possibility that the NAIRU may
fall to 5.25% in the coming year. The National Association of Manufacturers estimates
it to be already at 5.2%.
7.  Interestingly, the U.S. has currently the lowest deficit as percentage of GDP of all
major industrial countries. Japan’s is at 3.1%, Germany’s at 3.5%, Canada at 4.2%,
France’s at 5.0%, the U.K.’s 5.1% and Italy’s at 7.2%. The problem is that the U.S.’
federal deficit is projected to widen again after 1997 if there is no change in fiscal
policies.
8.  Some analysts argued that, perhaps, the U.S. dollar was bought by Taiwanese during
the build-up of the political tension in the Taiwan Straits preceding the Presidential
election in Taiwan. My response is that if the Straits tension had been the cause for thedollar buying, one should also have observed a private net capital inflow into the U.S..
But there was a net private capital outflow. Of course, a Taiwanese government
purchase of the dollar would still count as a vote of confidence in the U.S. economy,
albeit an official vote of confidence  instead of the private one, which Dr. Greenspan,
mistakenly, observed behind the dollar’s strength in his July HH testimony. Although
we cannot discern it from the official data, it seems that it was mostly Japanese
government purchases which supported the dollar for the stated mercantilist reasons.